On the Duration of Technology Licensing by Gordanier, John & Chun-Hui, Miao
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
On the Duration of Technology Licensing
John Gordanier and Miao Chun-Hui
University of South Carolina
July 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20329/
MPRA Paper No. 20329, posted 1. February 2010 00:28 UTC
On the Duration of Technology Licensing
John Gordanier and Chun-Hui Miao
Abstract
We model an innovators choice of payment scheme and duration as a joint decision in a
multi-period licensing game with potential sequential innovations and some irreversibility of
technology transfer. We nd that it may be optimal to license the innovation for less than the
full length of the patent and that royalty contracts can be more protable than xed-fee licensing
even in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion. Moreover, licensing contracts
based on royalty have a longer duration than xed-fee licenses and are more likely to be used
in industries where sequential innovations are frequent and intellectual property protection is
weak. Our paper also highlights an important link between the study of technology licensing
and the theory of durable goods. (JEL D86, L13, L24)
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Technology transfer through licensing is a common method to utilize a patent. A large literature
on technology licensing has studied the optimal payment scheme of selling a cost-reducing innovation
(Arrow 1962, Kamien and Tauman 1984, 1986, 2002, Katz and Shapiro 1986, Kamien, Oren and
Tauman 1992; see Kamien 1992 for a survey). It has been shown that licensing by means of a
royalty is inferior to that of a xed-fee or an auction for an outside innovator, regardless of the
industry size or the magnitude of the innovation.
Subsequent studies have tried to explain the wide prevalence of royalties in practice by exam-
ining the many variants of the standard model. These studies include models with asymmetric
information (Gallini and Wright 1990; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo, 1991; Beggs, 1992; Pod-
dar and Sinha, 2002; Sen, 2005), variation in the quality of innovation (Rockett, 1990), product
di¤erentiation (Muto, 1993; Wang and Yang, 1999; Poddar and Sinha, 2004; Stamatopoulos and
Tauman, 2003), moral hazard (Macho-Stadler, Martinez-Giralt and Perez-Castrillo, 1996; Choi,
2001, 2002; Jensen and Thursby, 2001), risk aversion (Bousquet, Cremer, Ivaldi and Wolkowicz,
1998), incumbent innovator (Shapiro, 1985; Wang, 1998, 2002; Kamien and Tauman, 2002; Sen,
2002; Sen and Tauman, 2003), Stackelberg leadership (Filippini, 2001; Kabiraj, 2004, 2005) or
strategic delegation (Saracho, 2002).
However, surprisingly few studies have examined the duration of technology licensing, even
though it is an important dimension of every contract. More concretely, should the innovator
license the innovation for the entire length of the patent, or should a series of short-term contracts
be used? While existing theoretical models implicitly assume that a license remains in e¤ect for the
duration of the patent, most actual contract agreements terminate before the underlying patents
expire. Anand and Khanna (2000) study the structure of licensing contracts that involved at
least one US participant and were signed during the period 1990-93. They nd that no contract
agreement lasts more than 10 years, even though the length of patent protection ranges from 14 to
20 years in the US.
A more interesting fact is the variation in the duration of licensing contracts. Macho-Stadler,
Martinez-Giralt and Perez-Castrillo (1996) study a sample of 241 contracts between Spanish and
foreign rms and nd that contracts based on royalties tend to have a longer duration than xed-
fee contracts. Of the contracts containing xed payments, 24.5% are one-year contracts, while this
proportion falls to 6.2% in the set of contracts containing royalty payments. At the other extreme,
58% of the 174 contracts with royalty payments are long-term contracts (at least ve years), while
only 15% of the contracts with xed payments had a duration of at least ve years. Using the same
dataset, Mendi (2005) studies the impact of contract duration in determining scheduled payments in
technology transfer. He nds a positive relationship between contract duration and the probability
of the parties including royalties in the rst period of the agreement.1
In this paper, we introduce a model of technology licensing that analyzes the duration of con-
tracts as well as the optimal payment scheme. We focus on an outsider innovators optimal licensing
policy in a setting with potential sequential innovations and some irreversibility of technology trans-
fers. We nd that it can be optimal to issue a license for less than the length of the patent; even
in the absence of information asymmetry and risk aversion, royalty can be more protable than
xed-fee licensing. Moreover, licensing contracts based on royalty tend to have a longer duration
and are more likely to be used in industries where sequential innovations are frequent and intellec-
tual property protection is weak. These ndings are broadly consistent with the stylized empirical
facts.2
Our model builds on two observations. First, technology advances are destructive. A new
innovation often renders past ones obsolete. This means that an innovator who engages in a series
of innovations potentially faces a time-consistency problem in technology licensing: once a license
is sold, the innovator may have an excessive incentive to invest in new technologies. This decreases
the value of the initial license. At the same time, it may be too costly to write a complete long-
term contract in which license fees are contingent upon the outcome of risky investments for future
improvements (Williamson 1975). Therefore, a long-term xed-fee license may be sub-optimal.
Second, the transfer of knowledge is irreversible. Once transferred, it is di¢ cult for the innovator
to retract the knowledge from a licensee (Caves, Crookell and Killing 1983; Brousseau, Coeurderoy
and Chaserant 2007). This means that a licensee may be able to utilize an innovation even after
the license has expired. We call this "technology leakage" and model it as the licensee retaining a
fraction of the cost savings of the initial innovation without renewing the license.3 Conceptually, we
1The author also provides a theoretical model to explain the nding, but it di¤ers from ours in many aspects,
among which the most crucial is that the duration of contract is exogenous in his but not in ours.
2The empirical support for the nding that relates the use of royalty to sequential innovations and intellectual
property protection is discussed in Section IV.D.
3Our use of the term "technology leakage" should be distinguished from the occasional uses in newspaper articles
(e.g., "Expulsions Tied To Fear Of Technology Leaks", Philip Taubman, New York Times, April 24, 1983) that refer
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can think of a technology as embodying both tangible assets and intangible know-how. While the
termination of a license may stop the use of tangible assets by past licensees, it is di¢ cult, if possible
at all, to prevent them from utilizing the technology know-how. The existence of technology leakage
creates a potential downside for short-term contracts.
The innovators problem in our model is reminiscent of the classic time-consistency problem of
a durable goods monopolist (Coase 1972, Waldman 1996, Rey and Tirole 2007). Indeed, one can
view the choice of short-term contracts by the innovator as analogous to the rental solution for
the durable goods monopolist.4 However, there is a fundamental di¤erence between the transfer of
intellectual property and the rental of a durable good: whereas for the latter the use of the property
is immediately terminated upon its physical removal at the conclusion of the contract, it is not so for
the former. To quote Richard Posner (2005), "Because intellectual property is readily appropriable
simply by being copied (in contrast to a rental car, for example, which can be appropriated only
by being stolen), preserving ones property rights when one licenses intellectual property is often
di¢ cult." This di¤erence means that a series of short-term contracts are su¢ cient in resolving a
durable goods monopolists commitment problem, but not an innovators. The main novelty of our
paper is to capture this observation by formally modeling technology leakage and studying its role
in the design of licensing contracts.
In our model, there are two periods. An innovator sells licenses, which can last a single period
or two periods, by either xed fees or royalties. Whereas long-term xed-fee contracts potentially
prevent technology leakage, they distort the innovators incentive to invest in subsequent innova-
tions. Neither are short-term xed-fee contracts able to resolve the innovators time-consistency
problem, since the investment level that minimizes her loss from technology leakage ex post gen-
erally deviates from her optimal investment ex ante. Long-term royalty contracts do not entail a
time-consistency problem, but they increase the cost of production thereby causing distortion in
output. Based on these trade-o¤s, we derive conditions under which it is optimal for the innovator
to license the technology for less than the length of the patent and conditions under which the uses
of royalty contracts are optimal.
to the more blatant theft of technologies. In our model, technology leakage is not illegal and is present only because
intellectual property protection is imperfect.
4To push the analogy further, royalty corresponds to "metering" used by a durable goods monopolist to approxi-
mate the rental outcome (Burstein 1960, Bulow 1982).
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It should be noted that, in a world of costless, complete contracts, the innovator could resolve
any time-consistency problem by making fees in a long-term contract contingent upon the outcome
of future R&D e¤orts. However, there are a number of reasons for why contracting upon future
innovations might be di¢ cult.5 There may be extensive costs associated with describing each state
of nature (Battigalli and Maggi 2002), search costs associated with thinking through contractsim-
plications (Klein 2002), complexity costs associated with transfers that are state specic (Anderlini
and Felli 1994, 1999), or simply physical costs associated with writing lengthy contracts (Dye 1985).
All these costs are salient in contracts that are contingent upon future innovations.6 In particular,
it is practically impossible to specify all possible forms that an innovation might take in advance
of the R&D e¤ort, making it di¢ cult to write a contract contingent upon any specic innovation
(Anderlini and Felli 1999). Even a contract that does not specify a future innovation but instead
is based upon the degree of cost savings of any innovation will require the courts be able to verify
the degree of cost savings. Therefore, we view our model as relevant to those markets, in which
complete contracts are too costly to write.
To our knowledge, Gandal and Rockett (1995) and Antelo (2009) are the only theoretical papers
that have examined the optimal duration of licensing contracts.7 The rst paper focuses on the
licensing of a sequence of exogenous innovations by xed fees. They derive conditions under which
the innovator licenses the initial technology bundled with all future improvements and conditions
under which licenses to each innovation are sold period-by-period. The other paper focuses on
royalties in a model of asymmetric information, in which a licensees output in a short-term contract
signals her cost. Neither paper compares di¤erent payment schemes, nor are they concerned with
the innovators time-consistency and technology leakage problems identied in this paper.8
5An obvious, simple exception to this is a contract that grants a licensee the right to any improvements on the
initial innovation, a case that we discuss in Section V.
6These transaction costs become even more pronounced in an auction setting, which necessarily involves multiple
parties.
7Farrell and Shapiro (2008) consider a variable royalty rate, contingent upon the outcome of a court challenge
of the validity of the patent. In their model, the innovator o¤ers licenses to all downstream rms by assumption,
therefore a xed-fee license is o¤ered only if the downstream rm has no competition. In an extension of their model,
they consider short-term licenses, which are contracts that do not survive a nding of validity.
8A number of papers study the optimal patent policy in markets with sequential innovation (Green and Scotchmer
1995, Scotchmer 1996, ODonoghue, 1998, Besen and Maskin, 2000, Denicolo 2002). In these models, a sequence
of innovations is undertaken by di¤erent rms rather than being concentrated in one rm and their focus is on the
length and breadth of patents. Oster (1996) is the only other paper that considers the optimal licensing scheme under
sequential innovation. By way of an example, she explores the strategic opportunities created by exclusive licensing
in a research-intensive market with sequential innovations, but contracts are short-term by assumption in her model.
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Our conceptualization of technology leakage is also related to papers by Macho-Stadler et al.
(1996) and Choi (2001), who have developed incomplete contract models of a licensing relationship
that is susceptible to moral hazard. They assume that the transfer of technology know-how is
costly and cannot be contracted directly. A royalty-based contract is optimal because it reduces
the innovators temptation of not actually transferring all the know-how.9 While these papers and
ours share the prediction that the use of royalty is positively correlated with the amount of know-
how involved in technology transfer, there are subtle di¤erences. They implicitly assume that a
technology can be transferred without transferring all necessary know-how; our paper complements
theirs by assuming that technology know-how, once transferred, cannot be withdrawn even after
the contractual relationship ends.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I presents the environment and
assumptions of our model of innovation and licensing. In Section II, we consider a simple example
to illustrate the basic intuition. In Section III, we solve the innovators period 2 problem. In
Section IV, we nd the optimal licensing scheme in period 1 and report comparative statics results.
In Section V, we discuss the robustness of our results. Section VI concludes. Any formal proofs
omitted from the main text are contained in the appendix.
I. The Model
Our model follows Kamien and Tauman (1986) (hereafter KT86) closely. We consider an industry
consisting of n  2 identical rms all producing the same good with a linear cost function, C(q) =
c0q, where q is the quantity produced and c0 > 0 is the constant marginal cost of production. In
addition to the n rms, there is an innovator that engages in a series of innovations. She seeks to
license the innovations to all or some of the n rms so as to maximize her prot.
The game lasts two periods. At the beginning of period 1, the innovator owns a patent on a
cost-reducing innovation, which reduces the marginal cost of production from c0 to c1: The patent
is valid for both periods. At the beginning of period 2, the innovator can make a further investment
in R&D. If the new R&D e¤ort is successful, then it will generate a second innovation that reduces
the cost of production further to c2; hence c2 < c1 < c0: Following Waldman (1996), we assume
9Similarly, in Choi (2002), royalties (as well as grant-back clauses) are used to overcome an innovators reluctance
of licensing core technologies to her rivals in the innovation market.
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Figure 1: The Timeline
that the probability of a successful second innovation is Pr and it increases with the amount of
investment I. For ease of exposition, we assign a particular functional form to Pr(I) such that it
equals 2
p
I; where   [2M (c2)] 1:10 The innovator stops all R&D activities after two periods
and the game ends. Figure 1 shows the timeline of the game.
In each period, the inverse demand function of the industry is given by p = maxf0; a   Qg;
where a > c0 and Q is the total production level.11 Denote by pM (c) the monopoly price in the
downstream market when the marginal cost is c; we assume that the initial innovation is drastic,
i.e., pM (c1) < c0;12 but the second innovation can be drastic or non-drastic, i.e., pM (c2) can be
below or above c1.
In order to model technology leakage, we assume that if a downstream rm that licenses the
technology c1 in period 1 does not license any innovation in period 2, its marginal cost of production
in period 2 is c0 2 [c1; c0). According to this assumption, a licensee can retain some fraction of
the cost saving from the initial technology transfer, even if he does not license that technology in
period 2.
Our main interest is in the innovators choice of period 1 licensing contracts. We assume
that the amount of investment is not observable to outside parties; hence it cannot be contracted
10This guarantees that the optimal amount of investment will be an interior solution. Our qualitative results will
not change if a more general form of the function is adopted.
11Only some of our results rely on the assumption of a linear demand, which is the most often used demand function
in the technology licensing literature. They will be clearly indicated where applicable.
The assumption of a constant market demand is for ease of exposition, but our model can be easily extended to
allow shifts in market demand across periods, as shown in Section V.C.
12 In the case of a drastic innovation, the granting of an exclusive license o¤ers such a large cost advantage that the
licensee can e¤ectively monopolize the industry (Arrow, 1962). The case of non-drastic initial innovations is discussed
in Section V.
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upon.13 While it is possible to write a contract that is contingent upon the outcome of the period
2 innovation, it costs ' to write such a contract.14 Since we do not explicitly model the transaction
cost ' and its impact on the choice of contracts is rather obvious, we assume that ' is so large
that a contingent contract is never optimal.15 Therefore, we only consider licenses that specify the
payment scheme, the number of licensees and the duration of the contract.16
As in KT86, in both periods, the innovator licenses her innovations to k  n rms either by
a xed-fee or by a royalty.17 ;18 The duration of a license issued in period 1 can be either one
period (short-term) or two periods (long-term). This means that there are four possible types of
licensing contracts: short-term xed fee (SF ) ; long-term xed-fee (LF ) ; short-term royalty (SR)
and long-term royalty (LR) : If the license is a long-term xed-fee contract, it species a payment
plan (f1; f2) ; where f1 and f2 are fees due at the beginning of period 1 and 2, respectively.19 If
the license is a royalty contract, then it species the royalty rate r for each unit that a licensee
sells. All individuals maximize their expected total prots, with a common discount factor of :
Our solution concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Here is a collection of notations that will be used throughout the paper. Some additional
notations on the cost of technology leakage are introduced in Section 3
pM (c) : Single-period monopoly price in the downstream market when the marginal cost is c:
13 It is a standard assumption in the incomplete contracts literature (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore
1990) that investments cannot be contracted upon either because they are too complex to be described or because
they stand for non-veriable e¤ort decisions. Edlin (1996) stresses that the di¢ culty in enforcement may lead to
breach of contract even when investments are contractible.
14According to Schwartz and Watson (2004), "Examples of ex ante contracting costs are (i) the e¤ort and time that
parties spend determining possible contingencies, calculating optimal terms, and drafting language; (ii) payments to
third parties, such as attorneys, who facilitate this activity; and (iii) technological investments that make messages
or state verication possible. Examples of ex post costs are (i) expenditures of time and money that the parties make
during litigation, and (ii) risk premiums that risk-averse parties forfeit when enforcement has a random element."
15To be more specic, it su¢ ces for ' to be greater than  (1   2)2 ; where 1 and 2 are dened in Section
III.B.a.
16For completeness, we also assume that the payment scheme cannot be contingent upon the two partiestrans-
actions with third-parties involving innovations other than the very patent in consideration, such as future improve-
ments.
17 In another version of the paper (available upon request), we consider two-part tari¤s by limiting our attention
to only exclusive licenses as in Choi (2001, 2002). Our qualitative results remain the same.
18Since contracts based on an auction are typically associated with a xed-fee payment, for conciseness, we lump
contracts based on a xed fee or an auction together and call them xed-fee contracts. In fact, since contracts based
on a xed fee are dominated by contracts based on an auction when buyers are symmetric (Kamien and Tauman
1986, 2002, Katz and Shapiro 1986), it su¢ ces for us to consider only the latter type of contracts and this is the
approach that we have taken, except where noted, in this paper. When buyers are asymmetric, a xed-fee policy can
be more protable than an auction policy (Stamatopoulos and Tauman 2009, Miao 2009).
19By o¤ering a payment plan, the innovator gives a licensee the right to terminate the contract in period 2 without
paying the second installment f2.
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qM (c) : Single-period monopoly output in the downstream market when the marginal cost is c:
M (c) : Single-period monopoly gross prot for the licensee who has a marginal cost of c.
 LS(k) : Gross licensing revenue from a single-innovation game for licensing scheme LS 2
fR;FFg, where R is royalty, FF is xed-fee, and k 2 Z+ denotes the number of licensees.

LS(k)
t : The innovators gross licensing revenue at time t for licensing scheme LS 2 fSF;LF; SR;LRg
and k 2 Z+ denotes the number of licensees. For notational simplicity, we drop the superscript
when doing so is unambiguous; particularly in period 2, since there are two innovation outcomes,
for each licensing scheme we use 2 to denote the period 2 gross licensing revenue if the new inno-
vation is unsuccessful and 02 the revenue if it is successful. The innovators period 2 R&D incentive
largely depends on the di¤erence between 2 and 02 and we denote it by :
LS : The innovators maximal prot (licensing revenue net of the investment) for licensing
scheme LS 2 fSF;LF; SR;LRg. We also denote by B the total prot for a vertically integrated
innovator.
II. An Example: The Period 2 Innovation is Drastic
In the standard one-innovation setting, a xed-fee license for the duration of the patent is optimal,
but this result does not extend to a model with sequential innovations. The reason is that the
innovator has an incentive to over-invest when presented with the opportunity for new innovations;
moreover, this time-consistency problem cannot be solved by a series of short-term contracts due
to technology leakage. The intuition is best illustrated by a simple example, in which the period
2 innovation is also drastic, i.e., pM (c2) < c1: Since c0  c1; we must have pM (c2) < c0. Hence a
rm who licenses the new innovation will become an e¤ective monopoly in period 2. This means
that the innovator can sell an exclusive license on the new innovation for a fee equal to the period
2 monopoly prot.20 To put it di¤erently, although technology leakage may weaken the innovators
bargaining position in period 2, it has no such impact should she succeed in the new innovation. It
is this feature that makes the example particularly tractable and illustrative.
20We view exclusivity as the exclusive use of a technology, but not the exclusive position in the market, although
an exclusive license for a drastic innovation does lead to a market monopoly. This means that the original licensee
may still enjoy the exclusive use of the initial innovation, but does not necessarily maintain its monopoly unless it
gains the exclusive license to the new innovation.
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The innovators incentive to invest in the period 2 innovation is driven by the payo¤ di¤erence
from the two outcomes of the innovation. The optimal level of investment is obtained when the
innovator is either vertically integrated with a downstream rm or able to commit to an investment
level in period 2 at the time when period 1 licenses are issued. Under either of these circumstances
the incentive to invest is driven by the payo¤ di¤erence M (c2)  M (c1):
However, if the innovator is neither vertically integrated nor able to commit, then the outcome
of a successful innovation may become more attractive. Suppose that the initial license is a standard
long-term exclusive contract with an upfront fee, then the innovator receives no income in period
2 unless the new innovation is successful. This means that her incentive to innovate will be driven
by M (c2). Therefore, the innovator has an incentive to over-invest in period 2, relative to the
investment level she would choose if she were able to commit in period 1.
Now suppose that the initial license is a short-term xed-fee exclusive contract. The original
licensee is not willing to pay the entire monopoly prot from renewing the license in period 2
because she will enjoy some of the cost savings from the innovation even if she does not renew the
license. Further, her possession of the leaked technology means that no other rm will be willing to
pay the entire monopoly prot. Thus, the innovator is unable to receive the entire monopoly prot
as licensing revenue in period 2. Let the revenue loss from leakage be 1; the innovators incentive
to innovate will be driven by M (c2)  [M (c1)  1]: Therefore, the innovator still has an incentive
to over-invest in period 2, but the degree of over-investment is smaller.
This example gives us the basic intuition why a short-term xed-fee contract may be preferred
to a long-term xed fee contract and why neither contract can achieve the rst-best outcome.
In the standard long-term xed-fee contract with upfront payments, the innovator faces a classic
time-consistency problem: Once a license is sold, the innovator is then tempted to invest in new
technologies that render the initial license obsolete; expecting this, rms will pay less for the
license. At the same time, a short-term contract entails technology leakage; so the innovator has
an incentive to choose an investment level to minimize the negative impact of technology leakage,
but this investment level generally deviates from the optimal.
Of course, the above analysis is far from complete. Clearly, the innovator may want to structure
a contract that deals with the time-consistency problem. Since the initial license will be worthless
once the period 2 innovation succeeds, a possible solution is to use an installment payment plan, in
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which the second installment is paid only if a licensee wishes to continue the contract. It is easy to
see that the second installment has to be as high as M (c1) in order for the innovator to overcome
her excessive incentive to invest, but for a payment this high the original licensee will terminate the
contract even if the period 2 innovation fails. In other words, a long-term contract that stipulates
a high continuation fee e¤ectively becomes a short-term contract, which may alleviate the time-
consistency problem but not eliminate it. This and other points will be discussed in more detail
when we solve the complete model.
III. Investment and Licensing in Period 2
We solve the game via backward induction. In this section, we consider the innovators period 2
problem. We rst nd the optimal licensing scheme under a cost asymmetry. It allows us to more
precisely dene the cost of technology leakage. We then derive the optimal investment level at the
beginning of period 2.
A. Licensing Under Cost Asymmetry
In period 2, downstream rms are no longer identical in their pre-licensing costs. Licensees of the
initial innovation will have lower marginal costs than non-licensees, either because the former has
signed long-term contracts or because of technology leakage. Here we focus on a scenario that is
relevant to our model, in which an exclusive license is granted in period 1 so that the period 2
cost asymmetry is between the original licensee and all others. We show that the optimal licensing
scheme under such a cost asymmetry is to once again issue a xed-fee exclusive license to the
original licensee.
Lemma 1 Suppose that rm 1 has a cost of ca and the other n   1 rms have a cost of c, where
ca  c: If an innovation allows a rm to produce at a cost of cb; where pM (cb) < c; then it is
optimal to issue an exclusive license to rm 1 for a xed fee via a Right of First O¤er.
Proof. Suppose that an optimal licensing scheme S exists, in which rm 1s net prot (prot
minus the payment for a license) is 0. Since the industry prots are no larger than M (cb); the
innovators licensing revenue cannot be greater than M (cb)   0 under scheme S: Now consider
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an alternative scheme, in which an exclusive contract is o¤ered for a xed-fee of M (cb)   0 and
rm 1 is given the Right of First O¤er: if rm 1 accepts, then the game ends; if rm 1 rejects, then
the innovator uses scheme S to sell the innovation. Since pM (cb) < c; rm 1 will be able to earn
the monopoly prot if it gets the exclusive license. Therefore, in the subgame perfect equilibrium,
rm 1 accepts the o¤er and the innovator receives M (cb)  0 as her revenue. This means that a
xed-fee exclusive contract is at least as protable as scheme S and is therefore optimal.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is straightforward. O¤ering an exclusive license to rm 1 ensures
that the market continues to be monopolized so that the industry prots are shared just between
the innovator and rm 1. After leaving rm 1 a surplus that it could have earned otherwise, the
innovator keeps all the gain in the industry prots. In such as case, any licensing scheme that
maximizes the industry prots also maximizes the innovators payo¤. But Lemma 1 does not
always hold if pM (cb) > c:21 It is our assumption that the initial innovation is drastic and thus any
improvement upon the initial innovation is also drastic against the old technology that allows us
to dwell on this case, which greatly simplies our task.
B. The Cost of Technology Leakage
A prominent feature of our model is technology leakage in short-term contracts. Because of tech-
nology leakage, the innovator may obtain a smaller licensing revenue in period 2 than she would
if the technology transfer were reversible. This loss in period 2 licensing revenue is what we call
the cost of technology leakage. Notice that this is not the same as the decrease in total licensing
revenue across both periods that results from technology leakage. Potential licensees, expecting
technology leakage in period 2, are willing to pay a higher price for the initial license.
Denition 1 The cost of technology leakage for an innovator is the di¤erence between the licensing
revenue she earns in case past licensees retain some of the cost savings, and the licensing revenue
in case they do not.
In order to nd the cost of technology leakage, one compares the innovators period 2 licensing
revenues with and without leakage, which, in general, is not an easy task. However, the comparison
21For example, in a duopoly, if the high cost rm obtaining a new technology leads to a higher industry prot
than the low cost one obtaining the same technology, then it is optimal to license the technology to the former
(Stamatopoulos and Tauman 2009).
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in this model is made simpler by the assumption that the initial innovation is drastic. Due to this
assumption and the fact that the period 2 innovation is necessarily an improvement over the initial
one, without technology leakage the innovator can always sell an exclusive license in period 2 for a
fee equal to the monopoly prots. In other words, the period 2 licensing revenue without leakage
is M (c2) if the period 2 innovation succeeds or M (c1) if it fails. Therefore, the cost of technology
leakage is either M (c2) 02 or M (c1) 2.
a. Technology Leakage From an Exclusive License
Moreover, if an exclusive license was issued in period 1, then the cost of technology leakage is exactly
equal to the prot that the original licensee can earn in period 2. This is because, according to
Lemma 1, it is optimal to o¤er a second exclusive license to the original licensee so that the innovator
and the original licensee split the monopoly prots in period 2. This means that any gain in the
bargaining power of the original licensee directly translates into the innovators loss of revenue. It
is this linkage that allows us to further quantify the cost of technology leakage based on the latters
prot in this special, but important case, of our model.
The cost of the technology leakage not only depends on the amount of cost saving, but also the
technologies available to rms that it competes with. Suppose that rm 1 has a cost of ca and the
other n   1 rms have a cost of c  pM (cb) before a new technology that lowers the cost to cb is
introduced by the innovator. Denote by  (ca; cb) rm 1s net prots (prots minus the licensing
fee) from licensing the new technology cb. The cost of technology leakage if the period 2 innovation
fails can thus be written as 1 =  (c0; c1). Similarly, the cost of technology leakage if the period 2
innovation succeeds is 2 =  (c0; c2) : In addition, we nd the value of owning an exclusive license
to the initial innovation in period 2 in the event of a successful period 2 innovation to be another
important variable. Using the notation just introduced, we can write it as l =  (c1; c2) :
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions on the costs of technology leakage:
Assumption 1 If ca < pM (cb); then  (ca; cb) > 0; if ca  pM (cb); then  (ca; cb) = 0:
Assumption 2 l < M (c1):
Assumption 3 1   2 < M (c1)  l:
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Assumption 1 states that the cost of technology leakage is zero if and only if cb is drastic against
ca, i.e., the availability of the new technology renders the leaked technology obsolete. Assumption
2 states that the value of having an exclusive access to a production technology of c1 cannot exceed
the monopoly prot earned with that technology. Assumption 3 further narrows down the range
of the costs of technology leakage. In Appendix B, we verify that these assumptions are met
in homogeneous good, conjectural variation oligopoly models. In Appendix C, we consider more
general models in which some of these assumption are not met.
One may wonder whether 2 is always smaller than 1, since the leakage appears to be less of
a concern should the period 2 innovation succeed. The answer is no, due to the integer constraint
in the number of licenses that the innovator can sell in period 2. As shown in Appendix B, if the
original licensee refuses the o¤er of an exclusive license, then the innovator will auction either 1 or
2 licenses in stage 2 of the period 2 licensing game. For a xed ca; when cb is close to ca; 2 is the
optimal number of licenses to sell in stage 2; when cb decreases, the optimal number of licenses to
sell in stage 2 will also decrease and at some point that number will "jump" from 2 to 1, diminishing
the threat that can be imposed on the original licensee. It is this discontinuity in the number of
licenses that causes the non-monotonicity in the cost of technology leakage, because of which we
cannot rule out the possibility that 1 < 2:
C. The Investment Decision and the Value of Investment
Now we solve the innovators problem at the investment stage in period 2. Let  = 02   2, we
have
Lemma 2 The optimal amount of investment is 2; the probability of a successful innovation is
2; and the innovators expected prot in period 2 is 2 + 2.
Proof. The innovators investment decision is maxI Pr (I)  I = 2
p
I  I: Denote by I the
optimal choice of I; we must have
p
=I = 1; i.e., I = 2: So Pr (I) = 2 and the expected
prot in period 2 is 2 + Pr (I)  I = 2 + 2:
Lemma 2 shows that the innovators incentive to invest in period 2 is entirely determined by
; the di¤erence in period 2 licensing revenues from the two outcomes. Hence,  can serve as a
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convenient indicator of a licensing schemes optimality, which we will use repeatedly in this paper.
Another result that allows us to easily compare licensing schemes is the following:
Lemma 3 The innovators expected prot in period 2 increases in both 2 and 02:
Proof. The innovators expected prot in period 2 is maxI 2 + Pr(I) (02  2)   I: Denote it
by 2: By the envelope theorem, d2=d2 =
@
@2
(Pr(I) (02  2)  I) jI=I = 1 Pr(I)  0 and
d2=d02 = Pr(I)  0:
IV. Licensing in Period 1
In this section, we nd the optimal licensing scheme in period 1, which is the central concern of this
paper. We start with the rst-best scenario for the innovator, whose solution is then used as our
benchmark. Then we solve for the payo¤s associated with each of the possible licensing schemes. We
compare them with the benchmark and discuss each schemes advantages/disadvantages. Finally,
we carry out some comparative statics exercises by varying the rate of innovation parameter and
the cost of technology leakage.
A. The Benchmark
In a rst-best scenario, the innovator is vertically integrated with a downstream rm and sells the
nal output by herself. There is neither a commitment problem nor technology leakage. Since
pM (c2) < p
M (c1) < c0, the innovator can monopolize the industry in both periods.22 Therefore,
her incentive to innovate in period 2 is perfectly aligned with the gain in industry prots, which is
M (c2)  M (c1).
Proposition 1 If the innovator markets the nal output by herself, then  = M (c2)   M (c1)
and her total prot is
(1) B = (1 + )M (c1) + [M (c2)  M (c1)]2:
22This also means that an innovator who is an incumbent in the industry will not license either innovation in our
model.
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Proposition 1 gives us the upper bound of licensing revenue that the innovator can obtain, which
serves as a useful benchmark in comparing di¤erent licensing schemes. It also provides a necessary
condition for any licensing scheme to generate the benchmark prots:  (i.e., 02   2) must be
equal to M (c2)  M (c1). This is true because the optimal level of investment is proportional to
2, so the period 2 investment must be ine¢ cient if  deviates from M (c2)  M (c1).
Vertical integration is not the only way for the innovator to obtain the benchmark prot. In a
world of costless, complete contracts, the innovator can replicate the benchmark outcome either by
o¤ering a long-term xed-fee license whose payments are contingent upon the innovation outcome
or by pre-committing her investment in period 1.
Proposition 2 (i) Denote by f1 the period 1 license fee, f2 (f 02) the period 2 license fee if the period
2 innovation fails (succeeds), a long-term xed-fee exclusive contract with f1 = M (c1); f2 = M (c1)
and f 02 = M (c2) replicates the benchmark outcome if ' = 0: (ii) Alternatively, a long-term xed-fee
exclusive contract replicates the benchmark outcome if the innovator can commit to in period 1 an
investment of [M (c2)  M (c1)]2:23
In reality, however, both vertical integration and writing complete contracts may be impractical:
a research university may want to keep arms length from the product market in order to avoid
conicts of interest; certain transaction costsdiscussed earlier may prevent future contingencies or
investments from being contracted ex ante. Therefore, we must also examine the optimal licensing
scheme when the above options are unavailable.
B. Fixed-fee Licenses
We rst consider xed-fee licenses. Since we assume that the initial innovation is drastic, a xed-
fee exclusive license is optimal in an one-innovation model (Katz and Shapiro 1986, Kamien and
Tauman 1986), but we show in this section that it is generally not true when there are sequential
innovations and technology leakage. In so doing, we also solve for the optimal xed-fee contracts.
To streamline our exposition, we restrict our attention to exclusive contracts in period 1. We will
verify in Section V. that this restriction is inconsequential.
23 In case (ii), the commitment case, there are many combinations of f1 and f2 that can be used to achieve the
benchmark outcome as long as f1 + f2 = B and f2  M (c1)  1:
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a. Short-term Fixed-Fee Exclusive License
In a short-term xed-fee exclusive contract, a licensee has the right to use the cost-reducing tech-
nology of c1 for just one period, during which he earns the monopoly prot M (c1). After the
contract expires at the end of period 1, the original licensee enjoys a cost of c0 < c0 because of
technology leakage, while the other n 1 rms only have the old technology of c0. In period 2, new
licensing takes place regardless of whether the innovator is successful in her R&D e¤orts.
Lemma 4 If a short-term xed-fee exclusive license is o¤ered in period 1, then SF = B  
 (1   2)2 ; if c0 > pM (c1) ; then 1 = 2 = 0 and a short-term xed-fee exclusive license replicates
the benchmark outcome.
Proof. According to Lemma 1, the period 2 license will be granted to the original licensee, who will
gain a monopoly, regardless of the innovation outcome. Thus 2 = M (c1) 1 and 02 = M (c2) 
2: Hence, I = [M (c2) M (c1)+ 1  2]2; SF2 = M (c1)  1+
 
M (c2)  M (c1) + 1   2
2
and SF1 = 
M (c1)+ (1  Pr) 1+ Pr 2; where Pr = 2
 
M (c2)  M (c1) + 1   2

: Therefore,
SF = (1 + )M (c1)  2 (1   2) 
 
M (c2)  M (c1) + 1   2

+ 
 
M (c2)  M (c1) + 1   2
2(2)
= B    (1   2)2 :
(3)
If c0 > pM (c1) ; then 1 = 2 = 0 by Assumption 1 hence SF = B. It is also easy to verify that
the innovator will choose the optimal investment level [M (c2) M (c1)]2 if she has the ability to
commit in period 1.
If the game lasts only one period, then the standard model predicts that a xed-fee license is
optimal (Kamien and Tauman 1986). Upon rst glance of our model, extending the game into two
periods adds little new: the innovator and potential licensees can contract period by period and
this reduces a two-period game into two one-period standard games. However, Lemma 4 tells us
that the benchmark outcome can be replicated by a series of short-term contracts only if there is
no technology leakage, otherwise technology leakage will cost the innovator  (1   2)2 ; where
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1  2 represents the di¤erence in the costs of technology leakage between the two outcomes of the
period 2 innovation.
It should be noted that the innovators period 2 revenue loss from technology leakage does not
directly translate into a loss in total licensing revenue: after all, expecting a leakage, rms will pay
more for the initial license. Rather, it is the innovators attempt to minimize the revenue loss from
leakage that causes a distortion in her incentive to invest in sequential innovations and this lowers
a licensees willingness to pay for the initial innovation. It can be seen most clearly by examining
 = 02   2; which equals M (c2)   M (c1) + (1   2) under a short-term contract. Thus, as
long as the costs of technology leakage are not identical under di¤erent innovation outcomes, the
innovators incentive to invest will deviate from the optimal level. It is this deviation that results
in the innovators loss in total revenue. In other words, the presence of both technology leakage
and sequential innovation are essential for short-term xed-fee contracts not to be able to replicate
the benchmark outcome.
b. Long-term Fixed-fee Exclusive License
Now we examine in detail long-term xed-fee contracts and their optimality. In our simple example,
only contracts with an upfront payment are considered and we nd that long-term xed-fee contracts
entail a time-consistency problem. To deal with the problem, the innovator may choose to o¤er
contracts with installment payments, allowing a licensee to either pay the period 2 fee or terminate
the contract after the innovation outcome is realized in period 2. More specically, the period 1
contract species the fees to be paid in each of the two periods and we denote them by f1 and f2;
if a licensee opts out in period 2, then the contract terminates and f2 will not be paid.24 ;25 Clearly,
a long-term xed-fee contract (f1; f2) that does not allow a licensee to terminate the contract in
period 2 is equivalent to a xed-fee contract (f1 + f2; 0) that allows for early termination. This
means that it is without loss of generality that we focus on contracts of the latter type. Figure 2
24Here we implicitly assume a zero termination fee, but this assumption is without loss of generality, since only
the di¤erence in the payments determines a licensees decision whether to continue or to terminate the contract and
a¤ects the innovators incentive to invest in a new innovation. If the contract instead species a non-zero termination
fee of f 02, then such a contract is equivalent to (f1 + f
0
2; f2   f 02).
Whats more, the two parameters, f1 and f2; are su¢ cient to cover all possible xed-fee payment schedules given
the models restrictions on the contract form. More elaborate fee schedules do not introduce additional degrees of
freedom, since the original licensee either continues the contract or opts out in period 2.
25A contract with installment payments can be implemented via an auction, in which the innovator rst announces
the period 2 payment f2 and then invites bids such that the winning bid becomes the period 1 payment f1.
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Figure 2: Period 2 Subgame Trees for Long-term and Short-term Fixed-Fee Contracts
illustrates the period 2 subgame. For the purpose of comparison, we also include the subgame tree
for short-term xed-fee contracts in Figure 2.
Lemma 5 In a long-term xed-fee exclusive contract (f1; f2), if 1  2 > 0 and f2  M (c1)  1;
then LF increases with f2:
Proof. In period 2, there are two states of nature: (i) innovation is not successful; (ii) innovation
is successful. In case (i) ; since M (c1)   f2 > 1; the original licensee will continue the contract
and get M (c1)  f2: Hence 2 = f2:
In case (ii) ; we separate f2 further into two regions: a) f2  l   2 and b) l   2 < f2 <
M (c1)  1:
(ii:a) f2  l   2: If the original licensee continues the initial contract and produces at a cost
of c1, then he gets l   f2; if he opts out, then he gets 2. Since l   f2  2; it is optimal for
the original licensee to continue the original license. This means that 02 = M (c2)   l + f2 and
 = M (c2) l: So the innovators incentive to invest is independent of f2: Therefore, her licensing
revenue is a constant if f2  l   2.
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(ii:b) f2 > l   2: If the original licensee continues the initial contract and produces at a cost
of c1, then he gets l   f2; if he opts out, then he gets 2. Since l   f2 < 2; the original li-
censees right to use the old innovation has no value and he will opt out the initial contract. This
means that 02 = M (c2)   2 and  = M (c2)   2   f2: In period 1, a rm is willing to pay
LF1 = 
M (c1)+(1 2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

)
 
M (c1)  f2

+2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

2 for an ex-
clusive license. At the same time, LF2 = f2+
 
M (c2)  2   f2
2
: Hence, the total licensing rev-
enue is LF = M (c1) + (1  2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

)
 
M (c1)  f2

+2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

2+


f2 + 
 
M (c2)  2   f2
2
, so @@f2
LF = 2
 
M (c1)  2   f2
  2 (1   2) > 0: Last, it
is also easy to verify that LF is continuous at f2 = l   2 and that LF (f2 = l   2) < SF :
Lemma 6 If 1   2 > 0; then any equilibrium long-term xed-fee exclusive contract (f1; f2) and
f2  M (c1)  1 is equivalent to a short-term exclusive contract with a xed fee of f1:
Proof. If the period 2 innovation is not successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original
licensee can obtain is M (c1)   f2 by continuing the contract and 1 by opting out. Since 1 
M (c1)  f2; the contract will be terminated after period 1.
If the period 2 innovation is successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original licensee
can obtain is l   f2 by continuing the initial contract and 2 by opting out. Since l   f2 <
l + 1   M (c1) < 2; the initial contract will also be terminated after period 1.
Lemma 7 If 1   2 < 0; then there exists a long-term xed-fee exclusive contract that replicates
the benchmark outcome.
Proof. Consider a long-term xed-fee contract (f1; f2) with f1 = M (c1)+2 and f2 = M (c1) 2:
If the period 2 innovation is not successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original licensee
can obtain is M (c1)   f2 = 2 by continuing the contract and 1 by opting out. Since 1 < 2;
the contract will be continued after period 1 and thus the original licensee is willing to pay f1 =
M (c1) + 2 in period 1. Also, we obtain that 2 = f2 = M (c1)  2:
If the period 2 innovation is successful, then the period 2 surplus that the original licensee can
obtain is l f2 by continuing the initial contract and 2 by opting out. Since l M (c1)+2 < 2;
the initial contract will be terminated after period 1 and the original licensees period 2 surplus is
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2. This again means that the original licensee is willing to pay M (c1) + 2 in period 1, so we
obtain that 02 = M (c2)  2:
Since  = 02 2 = M (c2) M (c1); the innovators incentive to invest in period 2 is optimal.
Therefore, the given contract replicates the benchmark outcome.
Using the above lemmas, we obtain the following result for xed-fee contracts.
Proposition 3 For homogeneous good, conjectural variation oligopoly models, (i) If 1   2 
0; then there exists a long-term xed-fee contract that replicates the benchmark outcome; (ii) if
1   2 > 0; then a short-term contract is optimal among xed-fee licenses.
The intuition for the above result is easy to understand. As shown in the simple example, in
a long-term xed-fee contract, the innovator has an incentive to over-invest in order to make the
initial license obsolete. To mitigate this incentive, the innovator can increase f2; the continuation
fee on the initial license. But too high a continuation fee will lead the original licensee to terminate
the initial contract regardless of the innovation outcome, replicating a short-term contract. Hence
f2 can not exceed M (c1)  1. On the other hand, the continuation fee that allows the innovator
to replicate the benchmark outcome is M (c1)   2: The two conditions can both be met only if
M (c1)   2: < M (c1)   1; i.e., 1 < 2; 26 otherwise a long-term xed-fee contract is at best as
protable as a short-term one.
As shown in the proof, the optimal xed-fee contract depends on comparing the costs of technol-
ogy leakage, especially 1  2 and M (c1)  l: In homogenous good, conjectural variation models,
we have Assumption 2 and 3, which signicantly reduce the number of cases to consider. For more
general models, the results are analogous, but the proof are somewhat tedious, so we leave them in
the appendix.
C. Royalty Licenses
Next we consider the optimality of short-term and long-term royalty licensing schemes. We will use
a result attributed to KT86: in an one-innovation licensing game, under Cournot competition with
a linear demand, the licensing revenue from royalty  R(k)(r) on a drastic innovation that reduces
26 It should also be noted that the continuation fee does not have to be positive. In fact, if M (c1) < 2, then
the optimal continuation fee will be negative; or to put it di¤erently, the continuation fee will be greater than the
termination fee.
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the production cost from c0 to c1 is maximized at r = (a  c1) =2 and k = n for a maximum of
 R(r) = nn+1
M (c1); under Bertrand competition, r = (a  c1) =2, k = n and  R(r) = M (c1):
a. Short-term Royalty
Like a short-term xed-fee license, short-term royalty contracts last only one period, but they
generally admit more licensees in period 1. Hence, in period 2, more than one rms may have
access to the part of cost saving that is irreversible. This makes an explicit solution to the period
2 licensing game di¢ cult to obtain. Therefore, we simply compare the two licensing schemes and
rule out short-term royalty as a possible optimal scheme.
Lemma 8 Short-term royalty is less protable than short-term xed-fee exclusive licensing.
Proof. Recall that the innovators total licensing revenue net of investment is  = 1 + 2 +
(02 2)2: Our plan of the proof is to show that all three terms, 1;2 and 02, are lower under
short-term royalty (SR) than under short-term xed-fee exclusive licensing (SF ) and therefore the
same must be true for  according to Lemma 3.
First, it is easy to see that SR1  M (c1)  SF1 : Next we consider period 2 licensing if the
innovation fails so that the best technology available remains c1. Because of technology leakage,
k1  1 rms have a cost of c0 at the beginning of period 2 under SR but only 1 rm has c0 under
SF: All other rms have a cost of c0 > c0:
Let the period 2 optimal licensing scheme under SR be O. We want to show that under SF
a scheme based on O can give the innovator a period 2 licensing revenue at least as much as
SR2 : Consider scheme O
+, under which scheme O is used along with a royalty contract o¤ered to
k1   1 rms that allows them to use the cost-reducing technology c1 for a rate of c0   c1. For the
k1   1 rms o¤ered a royalty, their cost e¤ectively becomes c1 + (c0   c1) = c0: Thus, in total, k1 of
rms will have a cost of c0 when they participate in scheme O: This means that scheme O+ allows
period 2 licensing under SF to replicate the licensing game played under scheme O and therefore
 O
+  SR2 ; where the inequality holds if the royalty o¤er is taken by a positive number of rms.
Since O+ is not necessarily the optimal scheme under SF , we must have SF2   O
+
and therefore
SF2  SR2 : The same argument, except that the royalty rate should be set at c0   c2; can be
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applied to the case of a successful period 2 innovation to show that 02 is lower under SR than
under SF:
The intuition behind the proof goes as follows: when compared with short-term xed-fee licens-
ing, short-term royalty generates a smaller period 1 licensing revenue and leads to a greater degree
of technology leakage, which lowers the licensing revenue in period 2 regardless of the innovation
outcome. In particular, under a xed-fee contract the innovator is able to capture a licensees
gain from technology leakage, whereas under a royalty the innovator is unable to. This, however,
suggests that a two-part tari¤ can potentially improve upon pure royalty, an observation that we
will return to in Section V.
b. Long-term Royalty
Under a long-term royalty scheme, a licensee is entitled to use the period 1 innovation of c1 for
both periods and pay r1 (reps. r2) for every unit of output produced in period 1 (reps. 2). Here
we allow the royalty rate to change because the optimal royalty rate varies with market demand,
which may be di¤erent across periods. However, in the constant demand case we consider in this
model the two royalty rates coincide. More importantly, they are shown to be the same as the
royalty rate that maximizes revenue in a one-innovation licensing game.
Lemma 9 Under Cournot competition with linear demand, the optimal royalty rate in each pe-
riod is r = (a  c1) =2 in a long-term royalty contract and the licensing revenue is LR =
(1 + )  R(r) + 
 
M (c2)   R(r)
2
; under Bertrand competition, the optimal royalty rate in
each period is r = (a  c1) =2 in a long-term royalty contract and the licensing revenue is LR =
B:
Proof. If the period 2 innovation is not successful, then 2 =  R(r2). Hence LR =(1 + )  R(r2)+

 
02    R(r2)
2
. In order to nd the optimal royalty rate in period 2, we separate the possible
choice of r2 into two regions: (i) r2  r or (ii) r2 < r; where r = (a  c1) =2 is the optimal
royalty rate in a one-innovation licensing game.
(i) If r2  r; then the period 2 innovation c2 is drastic against an original licensees total
cost c1 + r2; since pM (c2) < pM (c1)  c1 + r2. Therefore, if the period 2 innovation is successful,
then the licensing revenue from it is maximized via a xed-fee exclusive license. This means that
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02 = M (c2) and LR =  R(r1)+ R(r2)+
 
M (c2)   R(r2)
2
. We can see that the innovators
total prots LR increases with  R(r2); since
(4)
@
@ R(r2)
LR = [1  2(M (c2)   R(r2)]  0:
Therefore, r2 should be chosen so as to maximize  R(r2); i.e., r2 = r: Thus,
(5) LR = (1 + )  R(r) + 
 
M (c2)   R(r)
2
:
(ii) In order for r2 < r to be a protable deviation from r, we must have  R(r2)+
 
02    R(r2)
2
>
 R(r) + 
 
M (c2)   R(r)
2
and 02 >  R(r2): But  R(r) + 
 
M (c2)   R(r)
2   R(r2) +

 
M (c2)   R(r2)
2   R(r2)+   02    R(r2)2 ; a contradiction. The rst inequality is due to
Eq. (4) and the second is due to 02  M (c2):
Under Bertrand competition,  R(r) = M (c1) hence LR = B:
Royalty contracts generally cannot replicate the benchmark outcome under Cournot competi-
tion. In standard one-innovation models, they are inferior to contracts based on a xed fee or an
auction27. But in a model with sequential innovations, a long-term royalty contract can avoid both
the technology leakage problem in a short-term contract and the time-consistency problem in a
xed-fee contract. Intuitively, the use of royalty to collect payments on an ongoing basis eliminates
the innovators commitment problem. It is this advantage that makes royalty a potentially optimal
licensing scheme.
It should be noted that the licensing revenue obtained in Eq. (5) is likely to be the lower bound
for a long-term royalty contract. If renegotiations are allowed, the innovator can potentially increase
her revenue. For example, in the above discussion, we have implicitly assumed that the innovator
cannot change the licensing scheme for the period 1 innovation in period 2 if the new innovation
is not successful. Now suppose that the innovator can modify licensing contracts with individual
licensees, then it is optimal to move from the royalty scheme to a xed-fee exclusive licensing in
period 2. This change will increase the period 2 licensing revenue without a¤ecting the period 1
27This is due to the fact that licensees, on top of the royalty fee charged by the innovator, will charge an additional
mark-up. Only as the number of licensees gets large, so that each licensee has no market power, is the innovator
able to extract the entire monopoly prot.
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royalty rate and thus may increase the innovators total prots. Under Cournot competition, it
can be shown that the innovators total revenue will then become  R(r)+

1  1
(n+1)2

M (c1)+


M (c2) 

1  1
(n+1)2

M (c1)
2
; which is greater than LR obtained in Eq.(5) ; since  R(r) =
n
n+1
M (c1) <

1  1
(n+1)2

M (c1):
D. Summary of results and Comparative Statics
Now we summarize the comparison of di¤erent licensing schemes and discuss how the choice of
licensing schemes varies with the model parameters. In so doing, we also provide some potential
testable hypotheses, which can serve as guidance for future empirical work.
Proposition 4 Under Cournot competition with linear demand, (i) If 1   2 < 0; then the opti-
mal licensing contract is a long-term xed-fee contract, where LF = B; (ii) if 1   2 > 0, then
the optimal licensing contract is either SF or LR; where SF = B    (1   2)2 and LR =
(1 + )  R(r)+ 
 
M (c2)   R(r)
2
; which approaches B when n!1: Under Bertrand com-
petition, the optimal licensing contract is a long-term royalty with LR = B:
For any xed-fee contract, short-term or long-term, the payo¤ of the innovator stays the same
for any size of oligopoly and is bounded away from the benchmark prot, but the payo¤ from a
long-term royalty always increases in n; the size of the oligopoly, and can be made arbitrarily close
to the benchmark prot by increasing n: Therefore, even in the absence of information asymmetry
and risk aversion, royalty licensing can be more protable than xed-fee contracts when the size of
the oligopoly is su¢ ciently large.28
Corollary 1 Denote by ~n the size of the oligopoly such that LR = SF and A = M (c2)=M (c1):
Under Cournot competition with linear demand, @~n=@ < 0:
Proof. From Proposition 4, we get
@
@ ~n =   (n+ 1)

1 + 2 (n+ 1) (A  1) + (1   2)2 (n+ 1)2

= ((n+ 1) (1 +    2A) + 2n) <
0:
When we vary the parameter governing the probability of innovation, we nd that non-exclusive
royalty contracts are optimal for higher levels of innovation. The reason is that increasing the
28Sen (2005) uses the same bounds approach to show that royalty licensing can be superior to both xed fee and
auction in a one-innovation setting due to the integer constraint on the number of licensees.
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rate of innovation magnies the innovators incentive to engage in R&D, thereby exacerbating the
over-investment problem under xed-fee contracts. This suggests that industries where sequential
innovations are common are more likely to use non-exclusive royalty contracts. Although there is
no direct evidence to support this prediction, Anand and Khanna (2000) do nd that the incidence
of exclusivity varies considerably across industries.29 In Computers (18%) and Electronics (16%),
two industries that are well known for sequential innovations (Bessen 2004, Bessen and Maskin
2000), exclusive transfers are much less common than in the other industries (38%).30
Our model also suggests that exclusive contracts may be more likely used in industries that have
strong intellectual property protection so that technology leakage is of less concern. This hypothesis
is compatible with the pattern of licensing observed by Anand and Khanna (2000): the chemical
industries, which have high invent-around costs and patents that deliver strong appropriability
(Levin et al. 1987, Cohen et al. 2000), also have higher incidences of exclusive licensing than other
industries.31
V. Discussion
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of relaxing some of our assumptions made in the basic model.
Our results appear robust to these extensions.
A. Multiple Fixed-Fee Licenses
For ease of exposition, we only allowed the innovator to sell an exclusive xed-fee license on the
initial innovation in the main results. Here we consider the possibility that the innovator sells
multiple xed-fee licenses in period 1. First, if these licenses are short-term, then their optimality
will not change our results. Second, if these licenses are long-term, then the industry prots in
period 2 will be lower than the monopoly prot if the new innovation is not successful; in itself,
29They have not been able to gather reliable information on the form of payment (royalties versus xed fees) agreed
to in the licensing contracts.
30Anand and Khanna (2000) o¤er an alternative explanation based on Katz and Shapiro (1986): network exter-
nalities are important in the computer and electronics industries and thus may have led rms to license technologies
non-exclusively, with the aim of setting the standard early on. Note that the two explanation are not mutually
exclusive.
31 It should be noted, however, that the two factors, sequential innovation and technology leakage, may be con-
founding each other in explaining the above pattern of licensing, since Anand and Khanna (2000)s study concentrates
on only three industries: Chemicals, Computers and Electronics. Further research is needed to identify which of the
two factors is more responsible for the observed pattern.
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it lowers the innovators potential licensing revenue; at the same time, it also creates incentive for
the innovator to over-invest. In the appendix, we prove that issuing multiple long-term xed-fee
licenses is never optimal in our model.
B. Non-drastic Innovation
Our current analysis has been limited to drastic innovations in period 1. If the innovation in period
1 is not drastic, then it may no longer be optimal to o¤er an exclusive license in period 1.32 Instead,
a xed-fee license may be o¤ered to multiple rms, either as a long-term contract or a short-term
contract. A detailed analysis will be complicated and is beyond the scope of this paper.33 However,
the basic trade-o¤ between the value of the initial innovation and the incentive to engage in future
innovations remains the same. More importantly, we nd that short-term royalty is never optimal
even if the period 1 innovation is non-drastic, as shown in the appendix, while short-term xed-fee
licensing can be optimal when there is no technology leakage. Therefore, we expect our result that
royalties on average have a longer duration than xed-fee contracts to continue to hold.
C. Shifts in Market Demand
Another possibility that we want to consider is the change in the size of the market across two peri-
ods. As long as the period 2 demand is common knowledge, our results do not change qualitatively.
Under both short-term and long-term xed-fee schemes, the innovator is able to extract the entire
period 1 monopoly prot as her licensing revenue. Therefore, the size of the period 1 monopoly
prot does not a¤ect the comparison between short-term and long-term xed-fee contracts. Royalty
contracts are slightly more complicated, since they involve a trade-o¤ between resolving the time-
consistency problem in period 2 and lowering licensing revenue in period 1, but it is not di¢ cult to
see that royalties are more likely to be used when the market demand is larger in period 2.
One trivial exception is the possibility of delayed licensing, i.e. the innovator can choose not
to o¤er any license in period 1 and only o¤er licenses after the outcome of the period 2 innovation
is realized. Such a delay allows the innovator to get the same expected net prot in period 2 as
32 In KT86, it has been shown that a xed-fee license sold to multiple rms is optimal in a one-period game if the
innovation is not drastic.
33The major complication involves solving the period 2 competition outcome with four di¤erent types of rms,
whose marginal costs can be any of c0; c1; c2 and c0.
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in the benchmark case, though she loses the monopoly prots in period 1. Clearly, if the market
demand in period 2 is su¢ ciently large relative to the period 1 demand, then delayed licensing
can be optimal. In the case of constant market demand delayed licensing is not optimal, since
the revenue loss from delayed licensing is M (c1) and we have M (c1) > [M (c1)]2=[2M (c2)] 

 
M (c1)
2    M (c1)  l2 ; where the last term is the revenue loss from a long-term xed-fee
contract with an upfront payment.
D. Two-part Tari¤
In this model, the licensing policies are conned to either pure xed fees or pure royalty. Here
we discuss what happens if the innovator can use two-part tari¤s, i.e., a combination of xed fees
and royalties, as a possible payment scheme.34 Since both xed fee and royalty are special cases
of the more general licensing scheme, the innovator cannot do worse by having the ability to use
the combination of the two. The question is therefore about which existing licensing scheme can
be improved by its combination with the other. First, it is clear that any pure xed-fee contracts
cannot be improved by adding a positive royalty, for otherwise the fee currently set could not have
been optimal; second, royalty contracts can potentially become more protable since the innovator
can use the xed-fee part of a two-part tari¤ to extract licenseesprots. Thus, allowing two-part
tari¤s increases the circumstances under which contracts with positive royalty rates are used. In
fact, Vishwasrao (2007) nds that contracts of longer duration are generally associated with a
combination of fees and royalties rather than royalties alone. Our model provides a useful starting
point to understand her empirical nding.
E. Follow-up Clause
In the main text, we assume that the innovator cannot o¤er contracts contingent upon future
improvements because of transaction costs. Here we relax this assumption and consider a simple
form of contract that su¤ers less from transaction costs. More specically, we consider a follow-
up clause that gives a licensee the rights to all future improvements upon the currently licensed
technology (van Djik 2000). It is easy to see that such a clause is not su¢ cient to restore the
34A two-part tari¤ can be implemented via an auction plus royalty policy where the innovator rst announces the
level of royalty and then auctions o¤ one or more licenses so that the upfront fee that a licensee pays is its winning
bid (Sen and Tauman 2007).
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innovators optimal outcome in our model because it leads to under-investment. In the extreme
case in which the licensee is entitled to future improvements exclusively, then the innovator will not
receive any additional licensing revenue in period 2 and therefore will not make any investment.
Even if the follow-up clause is not exclusive, the innovator will not be able to appropriate the full
rents from a successful innovation and will therefore under-invest.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have extended the literature on technology licensing by adding to the literature on
the duration of contracts, sequential innovations and a model of technology leakage. We show in this
framework that it may be optimal for the innovator to limit the length of xed-fee licenses to less
than that of the underlying patent. We nd that long-term, but not short-term, royalty contracts can
be optimal, even under complete information and risk neutrality, because they allow the innovator
to resolve a time-consistency problem caused by sequential innovation and technology leakage. This
implies that royalty contracts are on average of longer duration than xed-fee contracts, a result
generally consistent with empirical ndings.
It has long been recognized that the market of technology licensing is imperfect (e.g., Caves,
Crookell and Killing 1983). While other papers in the literature of technology licensing have
dwelt on incomplete information, moral hazard, risk and uncertainty, our paper focuses on the
irreversibility of technology transfer and the incentive to engage in sequential innovations. In
particular, we introduce the notion of technology leakage, which is shown to be an important
determinant in an innovators choice of licensing contracts. Nonetheless, it remains an under-
explored topic, which we believe will lead to fruitful researches.
The model presented here has made strong assumptions that can potentially relaxed. First, one
may examine whether our results extend beyond the articial two-period model. Second, in our
model, technology leakage is studied in detail only when one rm has a cost advantage over other
rms hence an exclusive license is the best form of contract. It can be challenging yet worthwhile
to quantify technology leakage in more general cases. On a related point, the optimal contract
when there is cost asymmetry among potential licensees deserves more attention in the literature.35
35Jehiel and Moldovanu (1996, 2000) and Jehiel, Moldovanu and Stacchetti (1996) include models of licensing to
asymmetric rms, but there is only one license which may be sold to a single buyer. Hoppe, Jehiel and Moldovanu
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Third, one can extend the analysis by allowing more general licensing schemes, including two-part
tari¤s. Last, we have contented ourselves with a positive analysis, but new and interesting questions
will arise in a normative analysis. These questions are left for future research.
(2006) considers a game in which multiple licenses are auctioned, but they impose restrictions on paramater values
that are not always satised in our model. Bagchi (2007) analyzes the optimal licensing mechanism when a buyer
can make bids for multiple licenses, but the equilibrium he considers is not subgame-perfect.
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A Proofs
Proposition 5 If the period 1 innovation is drastic, then any long-term xed-fee contract with
k  2 licensees in period 1 cannot be optimal.
Proof. Under Cournot competition with linear demand, if k  2 long-term licenses are sold in
period 1 for a xed fee, then the period 2 industry prots will be at most 8M (c1) =9 if the new inno-
vation fails, since D(c1) = 4M (c1) =9: This means that the total licensing revenue will be at most
M (c1)+

A+ (M (c2) A)2

where A = 8M (c1) =9: It is less than the benchmark prot B by

 
M (c1) A
 

 
M (c1) +A

+
 
1  2M (c2)
    M (c1) A  M (c1) +A = 17[M (c1)]2=81:
Now consider two cases. First, if 1  2 then according to Lemma 7, a long-term xed-fee exclu-
sive contract can replicate the benchmark outcome. Therefore, issuing multiple xed-fee licenses
cannot be optimal. Second, if 1 > 2, then  (1   2)2  21  (1=16) 

M (c1)
2
; where
1  M (c1)=4 (see the proof of Assumption 2 in Appendix B). Since B   SF =  (1   2)2 ;
we must have LF (k  2) SF  (1=16)  M (c1)2   (17=81) [M (c1)]2 < 0.
Under Bertrand competition, if k  2 long-term licenses are sold in period 1, then the industry
prots will be zero in period 2 if the new innovation fails. This means that the total licensing revenue
will be at least [M (c1)]2 less than the benchmark prot. According to Assumption 3 and its proof
in Appendix B, 0 < 1 2 < M (c1) l; we have  (1   2)2 < 
 
M (c1)  l
2  [M (c1)]2:
Hence LF (k  2) < SF :
Proposition 6 If the period 1 innovation is non-drastic, then short-term royalties cannot be opti-
mal.
Proof. Under Cournot competition with linear demand, we prove by showing that, for any short-
term royalty, there exists a xed-fee licensing scheme that issues a smaller or equal number of
short-term licenses and generates a greater period 1 licensing revenue. By the same argument used
in the proof of Lemma 8, we can then conclude that the short-term xed-fee licensing scheme must
be more protable than the short-term royalty.
Denote by k the optimal number of licensees in a one-innovation game when xed-fee licensing
is used. We have  R(n) <  FF (k
) according to KT86. Consider a short-term royalty scheme SR
31
that issues k royalty licenses in period 1. If k > k; then a short-term xed-fee contract with k
licensees generates a greater period 1 licensing revenue and has smaller technology leakage. Now
if k < k; then we can consider a short-term xed-fee contract with k licensees. The period 1
licensing revenue is SF1 >  
FF (k) = k[q(p  c1)  q0(p  c0)] where p is the equilibrium price and
q (resp. q0) is the quantity produced by a licensee (resp. non-licensee), while SR1 =  R(k) =
kq(n)(c0)(c0   c1); where q(n)(c0) is Cournot quantity with n identical rms whose costs are c0:
Since k < k; we have p > c0 (Kamien and Tauman 1986). In addition, q > max[q0; q(n)(c0)]: Hence

SF (k)
1 > k[q(p  c1)  q0(p  c0)] = k[(q   q0) (p  c0) + q (c0   c1)] > kq (c0   c1) > SR(k)1 :
Under Bertrand competition, any xed-fee license must be exclusive regardless of whether the
innovation is drastic, so the proof used in the drastic innovation case also applies here.
B The cost of technology leakage in Homogenous Good, Conjec-
tural Variation Oligopoly Models
In the main text, we make assumptions on the costs of technology leakage. Here we verify that
these assumptions are met in homogenous good, conjectural variation oligopoly models including
Cournot competition with linear demand and Bertrand competition.
Proof of Assumption 1. Suppose that a licensing scheme S exists such that the innovators
licensing revenue equals M (cb). Since post-licensing competition takes place among rms who sell
homogenous good at a uniform price, we must have p = pM (cb) > ca and i = 0 for all i = 1; 2; :::; n.
Now if rm 1 chooses not to license the innovation, then 1 = q1
 
pM (cb)

[pM (cb)  ca] > 0. This
means that S cannot be an equilibrium. Contradiction.
Proof of Assumption 2 and 3 Under Cournot Competition with Linear Demand. Fol-
lowing Lemma 1, we consider a licensing scheme that involves the Right of First O¤er to the rm
who has a cost of cb (rm 1) with the threat of an auction of xed-fee licenses: in stage 1, the
innovator o¤ers rm 1 a xed-fee exclusive license; if rm 1 accepts, then the game ends; but if
rm 1 rejects, then the innovator sells k licenses in stage 2 via a sealed-bid rst-price auction. The
cost of technology leakage is rm 1s net prot in stage 2, which depends on the number of licenses
that will be issued and whether rm 1 places a winning bid.
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Divide the range of possible values for ca into three regions: (i) ca 2 [cb; a+2cb3 ), (ii) ca 2
[a+2cb3 ;
a+cb
2 ) and (iii) ca  a+cb2 . In region (i), a rm with cost ca will earn positive prots in
competition with two rms that have cost cb. In region (ii), a rm with cost ca will earn positive
prots in competition with one rm that has cost cb, but zero prot with two or more rms. In
region (iii), a rm with cost ca will be driven out of the market if any other rm has a cost of cb.
i) Within this region we consider two possibilities, either k  2 or k = 1. We will show that
the licensing revenue from auctioning k  2 licenses has a lower bound and that it is greater than
the licensing revenue from k = 1 licenses. Therefore, the cost of technology leakage is rm 1s net
prot when k  2 licenses are auctioned, which has an upper bound.
If k = 1, then rm 1 will outbid others, since M (cb) > D(ca; cb) + D(cb; ca). In this case, the
winning bid will be the prots that a licensee would earn in competition with rm 1, D(cb; ca) =
(a+ ca   2cb)2=9:
If k  2; then the winning bid is at least (a+ ca 2cb)2=(k+2)2, the prot that a rm with cost
ca can earn as a licensee if rm 1 is not among the licensees. Thus, the licensing revenue must be
at least maxk k(a+ ca 2cb)2=(k+2)2 = (a+ ca 2cb)2=8 > (a+ ca 2cb)2=9, the licensing revenue
when k = 1: Next, if rm 1 wins a license, then its bid must be at least (a + ca   2cb)2=(k + 2)2.
Therefore, (ca; cb)  k(cb)  (a + ca   2cb)2=(k + 2)2  [(a   cb)2=(k + 1)2   (a   cb)2=(k +
2)2]jk=2 < M (cb)=4: If rm 1 does not win a license, then its prot as well as (ca; cb) will be
(a   ca   kca + kcb)2=(k + 2)2  (a   cb)2=16 = M (cb)=4: Further, since ca < a+2cb3 ; we get
(ca; cb)  M (cb)=4 < M (3ca a2 )=4 = 9M (ca)=16.
ii) Within this region, if k  2; then rm 1 can compete in the market only if it wins a license.
This means that the innovator can earn at least 2D(cb): = 8M (cb)=9 by auctioning 2 licenses.
Therefore, (ca; cb)  M (cb)=9 < M (2ca   a)=9 = 4M (ca)=9 < 9M (ca)=16.
iii) (ca; cb) = 0.
In sum, (ca; cb) < M (cb)=4 < 9M (ca)=16. Applying the denitions of 1; 2 and l; we obtain
that 1 < M (c1)=4 and l < 9M (c1)=16; therefore 1   2 + l < M (c1) and l < M (c1):
Proof of Assumption 2 and 3 Under Bertrand Competition. Under Bertrand competition,
licenses can only be protably sold to a single rm in each period. This is because Bertrand
competition yields zero prot to each rm, unless there is only one rm with a superior technology.
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Thus, we can obtain an explicit solution for technology leakage:
(6)  (ca; cb) =

M (cb)  (ca   cb)D(ca) if ca < pM (cb) ;
0 otherwise.
First, suppose that c2 is not drastic relative to c0; then 1 = M (c1)   (c0   c1)D(c0) and 2 =
M (c2)   (c0   c2)D(c0): Because qM (c1) maximizes prots when cost is c1; we know 1   2 =
M (c1)   M (c2) + (c1   c2)D(c0) > (pM (c2)   c1)qM (c2)   M (c2) + (c1   c2)D(c0): Note that
M (c2) = (p
M (c2) c1)qM (c2)+(c1 c2)qM (c2): Therefore, 1 2 > (pM (c2) c1)qM (c2) (pM (c2) 
c1)q
M (c2) (c1 c2)qM (c2)+(c1 c2)D(c0) = (c1 c2)(D(c0) qM (c2)) = (c1 c2)(D(c0) D(pM (c2))):
Since c2 is not drastic relative to c0 this must be positive.
Second, suppose that c2 is drastic relative to c0: In this case 1 = M (c1)   (c0   c1)D(c0) and
2 = 0; thus 1   2 > 0:
Last, 1   2 + l = M (c1)  (c1   c2)[D (c1) D(c0)] < M (c1) :
C More General Classes of Downstream Competition
In the main text, we have focused on the case of homogenous good, conjectural variation oligopoly
models, which allows us to impose restrictions on the costs of technology leakage. For completeness,
in this appendix, we solve for the optimal xed-fee licensing contracts without restricting the nature
of downstream competition. In addition to generalizing our main result, the following results further
illustrate the important role played by technology leakage in our model.
Lemma 10 In a long-term xed-fee contract (f1; f2), if either (i) 0 < 1   2 < M (c1)   l and
f2  M (c1)  1; or (ii) M (c1)  l < 1   2 < 0 and f2  l   2; then LF increases with f2:
Proof. Case (i) is proved in the proof of Lemma 5. An analogous proof can be constructed for
case (ii).
Lemma 11 In a long-term xed-fee contract (f1; f2), if either (i) 1   2 < M (c1)   l < 0 and
f2  M (c1)  1; or (ii) 1   2 > M (c1)  l > 0 and f2  l   2; then LF decreases with f2:
Proof. The following proof applies to case (i). An analogous proof can be constructed for case (ii).
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In period 2, there are two states of nature: 1: innovation is not successful; 2: innovation is
successful. In case 1; the original licensee will continue the contract and get M (c1)   f2; since
M (c1)  f2 > 1: Hence 2 = f2:
In case 2; we separate f2 further into two regions: a) f2  l 2 and b) l 2 < f2 < M (c1) 1:
(2:a) f2  l  2: If the original licensee continues the initial contract and produces at a cost of
c1, he gets l f2; if he opts out, he gets 2. Since l f2  2; it is optimal for the original licensee
to continue the original license. This means that 02 = M (c2)  l + f2 and  = M (c2)  l: So
the innovators incentive to invest is independent of2: Therefore, her licensing revenue is a constant
if f2  l   2.
(2:b) f2 > l   2: If the original licensee continues the initial contract and produces at a cost
of c1, then he gets l   f2; if he opts out, then he gets 2. Since l   f2 < 2; the original li-
censees right to use the old innovation has no value and he will opt out the initial contract. This
means that 02 = M (c2)   2 and  = M (c2)   2   f2: In period 1, a rm is willing to pay
LF1 = 
M (c1)+(1 2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

)
 
M (c1)  f2

+2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

2 for an ex-
clusive license. At the same time, LF2 = f2+
 
M (c2)  2   f2
2
: Hence, the total licensing rev-
enue is LF = M (c1) + (1  2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

)
 
M (c1)  f2

+2
 
M (c2)  2   f2

2+


f2 + 
 
M (c2)  2   f2
2
, so @@f2
LF = 2
 
M (c1)  2   f2

< 2
 
M (c1)  l

< 0:
Last, it is easy to verify that LF is continuous at f2 = l   2:
Lemma 12 If either (i) 0 < 1   2 < M (c1)   l and f2  M (c1)   1, or (ii) M (c1)   l <
1   2 < 0 and f2  l   2; or (iii) 1   2 < M (c1)   l < 0 and f2  M (c1)   1; or (iv) if
1 2 > M (c1) l > 0 and f2  l 2, then any equilibrium long-term xed-fee contract (f1; f2)
is equivalent to a short-term xed-fee contract with f = f1:
Proof. Case (i) is proved in the proof of Lemma 6. Analogous proofs can be constructed for the
other cases.
Lemma 13 If either (i) 1   2 < 0 and M (c1)  l > 0; or (ii) M (c1)  l < 0 and 1   2 > 0;
then there exists a long-term xed-fee contract that replicates the benchmark outcome.
Proof. Case (i) is proved in the proof of Lemma 7. An analogous proof can be constructed for
case (ii).
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From the above lemmas, we can conclude the following for xed-fee contracts.
Proposition 7 (i) If 1 2 and M (c1) l have di¤erent signs, then there exists a long-term xed-
fee contract that replicates the benchmark outcome; (ii) if they have the same sign, then the optimal
xed-fee license depends on the comparison of their absolute values: if j1   2j >
M (c1)  l ;
then a long-term contract with an upfront payment is optimal and generates a licensing revenue
that is 

M (c1)  l
2
below the benchmark prot, otherwise a short-term contract is optimal and
generates a licensing revenue that is  (1   2)2 below the benchmark prot.
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